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Tuesday 30 September 2008

The Hon Senator, The Professors and The Hon Speaker- the real intentions



pic. Prof AGO Mutambara and Prof Jonathan Moyo and Emmerson Mnangagwa the man behind the project

Senator Coltart correctly observes that “in any democratic country the office of Speaker is crucial in establishing and maintaining the integrity of Parliament.”

Despite his gloating about Paul Themba Nyathi’s integrity Zimbabweans know that Paul Themba Nyathi was the ringleader in the MDC split of 2005 and was uncompromising in articulating his ideological differences with Morgan Tsvangirai and those that remained loyal to him.

That is not the hallmark of neutral person. He is bigoted, dogmatic and pedantic in his approach to issues of conviction and would have made a speaker in the mould of other bigots like Didymus Mutasa.



Many Zimbabweans sighed in relief when they learned he had been soundly defeated in the Speakership election.

It is not clear on what basis did Senator Coltart believe a faction with a paltry 10 MP’s in a 210 chamber would win an election for such an important position as the Speakership given his denial that the faction not coalesced with either of the two Parties that had most of the seats.

“In other words notwithstanding the joint history and the support given to Morgan Tsvangirai's candidacy in the runoff, much of the focus of the negotiations was on the intra MDC party dispute, rather than on presenting a common front against ZANU PF,” revealed the Senator.

But earlier he had supported an opinion by faction Secretary General that suggested the faction would not be negotiated for by anyone and had severed ties with Tsvangirai the minute he pulled out of the runoff.

What support did Tsvangirai get from the faction in a runoff campaign that never was? Senator Coltart must not forget that we have not forgotten the resolutions of his faction on 20 August 2008 that supported the Zanu PF position in power sharing negotiations than it did Tsvangirai.

In any event by trying to land the most powerful position in Parliament the faction was trying to stage a coup on Tsvangirai’s MDC with the most Parliamentarians elected to that August House.

The desire to oust Tsvangirai and or outdo his MDC Party has been the bonding that gel the faction leadership. It will always be paramount on the faction’s political agenda for as long as Tsvangirai remains at the helm of the Party.

“A sizeable number of MDC T MPs were very happy that he had been nominated and indicated that they would vote for him,” falsely claimed Senator Coltart.

Which ones in particular would want to defect to a faction they had trounced in elections in constituencies it had bragged unrivalled support hitherto?

The only defections that are rational and are unavoidable are from the MDC PF faction to the more popular MDC led by Tsvangirai if those that got elected this time around entertain any chances of being re-elected in the next elections.

“Ironically the response from ZANU PF was that they believed that the MDC T would not be able to get more than 96 of its MPs into Parliament (because of their understanding that 4 MPs were in either exile or in hiding) and because of this they would be able to elect a ZANU PF MP as Speaker. It was only at 10 a.m. on Monday the 25th August 2008 that we learned that ZANU PF were not going to put up a candidate (when they realised that the MDC T had managed to get virtually all its MPs into the House) and that they would vote for Paul Temba Nyathi,” stated Senator Coltart.

Nothing can be further from the truth than this crap. The only reason why the MDC PF was bold enough to field Paul Themba Nyathi was because they had been assured of Zanu PF support.

Added to that was the assurance the faction had been given that the 4 MDC MP’s in hiding would be arrested on sight at Parliament therefore Nyathi had an assailable backing from the Zanu PF and MDC PF MP’s even if a few Zanu PF MP’ decided not to vote for him.

“On the evening of Sunday the 24th August a meeting of the MDC T Parliamentary caucus was held and its members were threatened with expulsion and the loss of their Parliamentary seats if they voted for Paul,” Senator Coltart disclosed.

But we are too familiar that it was infact his faction that resolved that on 20 August 2008 to gag its MP’s who had protested the pact with Zanu PF and threatened them with expulsion if they did not tow the line by voting against Nyathi.

“If anyone doubts the truth of this the fact remains that when the vote for Speaker was conducted MDC T MPs were obliged to show their ballots to MDC T MP and Vice President Thoko Khupe prior to voting.

There is both video evidence and the testimony of MPs to support this allegation. I understand that the allegation is not even denied by the MDC T; one MDC MP spoke at a meeting with church leaders in Harare last week and confirmed the allegation. They were forced to disclose their vote because of the well founded fear that many MDC T MPs would vote for Paul,” he further disclosed.

That opened and closed the case as far as the Senator was concerned. But of course the testamentary MP from the MDC T’s name is not disclosed because there is no such testimony in Coltart’s hands.

Further the video evidence he alludes to is not in the public domain and whoever has it is now supposed to doctor it to reflect this version that MDC T MP’s were coerced to show their ballots to Thoko Khupe.

It would be interesting to watch the video and hear the words Thoko Khupe used to coerce the MP’s to disclose to her who they had voted for. In any event even if they did, which has now been denied in opposition papers filed of record, the applicants still have the onerous burden of proving that those that disclosed the vote would have voted otherwise.

Since they are falsely alleged to have disclosed marked ballots, it is evident the mark was not placed under supervision by anyone and in any event the voting had already taken place in secret before it was published.

No sane Court can be expected to accept the trivia that voters were persuaded to vote as they did in the privacy of a booth exclusively reserved for their use when voting by threats of expulsion from the Party they represented in elections that were marred by violence which have no viva voce or written evidence of having occurred.

Assuming for once the ballots were published as alleged by applicants, which has been denied under oath, applicants still have to prove that the numbers that did so were substantial enough to have altered the outcome of the election in their favour if they had not displayed their vote.

The applicants also have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were prejudiced in any material way by the outcome of the election deserving of restitution in the form of the remedy they seek.

If they seek nullification of the result they will have to seek a further remedy of either declaring the looser winner or alternatively a rerun of the election under secretive conditions which are no longer possible to recreate in a Parliament where it is known that Zanu PF MP’s voted for Nyathi and will do so again in the rerun and likewise MDC MP’s for the MDC candidate.

The Court is unlikely to entertain an application that seeks leave of the Court for Professor Mutambara and his National Executive Council to discipline or threaten to discipline MP’s in its control for having voted against a candidate from their formation as that would set a dangerous precedent in Parliamentary democracy and defeat the very cause upon which the application is premised.

The applicants have the near impossible mission to convince the Court that the action they have resorted to is representative of the common position of Parliament on the election given that they are rooting for a loser, who personal has not complained about the election process nor has signalled support for the ill conceived application.

To succeed they need to produce affidavits showing that Parliament in its majority is against the outcome of the election which is impossible given two of the applicants represent a minority faction in parliament with inadequate numbers to win an election unless they have proof that they have support of Zanu PF MP’s who will not vote in any other direction in the privacy of a secluded booth and the other is a lonely independent MP.

More challenging will be the onus on the applicants to convince the High Court that it has jurisdiction over Parliamentary disputes given the precedent of the Dzikamai Mavhaire, “Mugabe must go” jibe, the Sydney Malunga “you are all morons” snide, the Margret Dongo “you are Mugabe’s wives” accusation and most pertinently the Chinamasa/Mutasa/Bennett fiasco and how they were disposed of by Parliament.

Because of its Constitutional existence Parliament like the Presidency and the Judiciary, is impossible to prosecute in public courts before domestic remedies in its constitution have been exhausted.

To challenge an internal parliamentary electoral process in open court will be impossible unless remedies in its Privileges Immunities and Powers which are recognised in the Constitution have been exhausted by the aggrieved.

As an example, the High Court has on numerous occasions refused to entertain applications by aggrieved employees on nothing else than that they have not exhausted remedies in their Codes of Conduct or the Labour Court, which is far less compelling than the Parliamentary Privileges and Immunities that the respondent Speaker has invoked.

The case will collapse at this early hurdle in its way and it will not be necessary for the Court to enquire into the merits of the matter.

Another issue unfavourable to the applicants is the reputation of Prof. Jonathan Moyo. He is highly litigious and is involved in multiple cases before the High and Supreme Courts and may attract a debilitating Court Costs Guarantee for this ill advised matter before he is entertained.

After losing this cause Prof Moyo must expect backlash litigation over his unresolved cases involving misappropriation of public funds at the Ford Foundation in Kenya and as Minister of Information.

A Tsvangirai led government will not stop his extradition to face trial in Kenya if Prime Minister Odinga requests same.

Coltart must be prepared to disclose the nature of financial moral and political support he landed Tsvangirai during the runoff and may end up in the dock for the nefarious activities he undertook under the false pretence he was fundraising for Tsvangirai.

The other two co-applicants must realise that their current action will be recounted when next they seek re-election and the prospects of re-election are remote.


Finally if Coltart did not enjoy fomenting the animosity he has through his ill conceived attempt to reverse a people’s rare Parliamentary victory he must be prepared for the ripple effects.

In functional democracies people do not expect losers to take charge of determining how power devolving from the electoral process will be exercised and by whom it will be exercised as they will have decided that.

For Coltart to endorse the involvement of losers in his faction in power sharing negotiations over people’s will is a indictment of what kind of a democrat he is.

Monday 29 September 2008

The Hon Senator, The Professors and The Hon Speaker-misguided and misdirected legal opinions and effort


pic. Prof Welshman Ncube ceased with errand legal opinions


The averment to the Prof Welshman Ncube and Sheila Jarvis opinions about the legality or otherwise of the Presidential runoff election that was staged on 27 June 2008 was nothing more than an attempt to arm whoever will preside over the election of Lovemore Moyo as Parliamentary Speaker the premise on which to uphold the challenge.


In his overzealous attempt to defend Prof Ncube’s flawed and out of context interpretation of the law Hon Senator Coltart argued that the adjudicator must when ceased with the matter ignore the Second Schedule of the Electoral Act 2:13 that upholds Tsvangirai’s election as President at S110 (3)(1) and instead uphold the Electoral Act S110(3) in so far as it sanctioned the runoff without the context in which it prescribes the runoff which coming from a qualified lawyer of Coltart’s experience and stature is most alarming.

He argued that where there is a conflict between a section of an Act and that one of the provisions in a schedule, the enactment in this section prevails over that in the schedule instructed by the opinions of Senior Counsel Adrian De Bourbon and Jeremy Gauntlett and extensive citations of case law therein.

But sadly while the principle he averred to is accurate and unambiguous, its application in the specific issue Sheila Jarvis had raised is questionable.

Jarvis did not argue that a clause in the Electoral Act should prevail over the clause in the act from which it devolves in all circumstances but rather that in the Zimbabwe Electoral Act the Second Schedule that evolved from Section 110 requires a specific performance from the Chief Elections Officer once he has tallied the results of a two or more candidate contested Presidential electorate and that performance is not in conflict with the basic clause of the Act.

Section 110(3) of the Electoral Act 2:13 is tacit and allows for no ambiguity in its interpretation when it states;

110 Determination and declaration of result of election to office of President
(1) -------;
(2) ---------;
(3) Where two or more candidates for President are nominated, and after a poll taken in terms of subsection (2) no candidate receives a majority of the total number of valid votes cast, a second election shall be held within twenty-one days after the previous election in accordance with this Act.

It then goes further to explain who will contest the runoff election so necessitated by the failure of initial contestants to secure a majority of the total number of valid votes – (which in Zimbabwe’s case is 50% plus one additional vote).

The Second schedule that explains the specific performances required of the Chief Elections Officer in respect of a multiple contested Presidential election details that;

SECOND SCHEDULE (Section 110)
DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Determination and declaration of result of Presidential poll
(1) After the number of votes received by each candidate as shown in each polling station return has been added together in terms of subparagraph (i) of subsection (3) of section sixty-five and the resulting figure added to the number of postal votes received by each candidate, the constituency elections officer shall forthwith—
a) ---------------------;
b) ---------------------;
c) -----------------------;
(2) Immediately after arranging for the constituency return to be transmitted in terms of paragraph (c) of subparagraph (1), the constituency elections officer shall affix a copy of the constituency return on the outside the constituency centre so that it is visible to the public.

That done the next procedure that is the start of the Chief Elections Officer’s specific performance is detailed as;

Procedure on receipt of constituency returns

2.(1) The Chief Elections Officer shall give reasonable notice in writing to each candidate or his or her chief election agent of the time and place where the Chief Elections Officer will verify and collate all the constituency returns.

2. (2) At the time and place notified for the verification and collation of the constituency returns referred to in subparagraph (1) and in the presence of such candidates, their chief election agents and observers as are present, the Chief Elections Officer shall display each constituency return to those present and shall, on request, allow a candidate or chief election agent of a candidate to make notes of the contents of each constituency return.

2.(3) When the Chief Elections Officer has completed the verification of the constituency returns under subparagraph (2) the Chief Elections Officer shall, in the presence of such persons referred to in subsection (2) as are present, add together the number of votes received by each candidate as shown in each constituency return.

Now equipped with the requisite verified results the Chief Elections Officer must proceed to announce the outcome of the election as prescribed by the Act at S 110(3) as follows;

Determination, declaration and notification of result of Presidential poll

3. (1) Subject to subparagraph (2), after the number of votes received by each candidate as shown in each constituency return has been added together in terms of subparagraph (3) of paragraph 2, the Chief Elections Officer shall forthwith declare the candidate who has received—
(a) Where there are two candidates, the greater number of votes;
(b) Where there are more than two candidates, the greatest number of votes;
to be duly elected as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe with effect from the day of such declaration.
It cannot be put any clearer than that or can it? This specific performance required of the Chief Elections Officer is not in any way linked to whether or not that greatest number of votes is 50% plus one additional vote or more or less than that. It is merely to do with who has the greatest number of votes after the election results have been verified and thus is entitled to be declared President after that election.

Such declaration will remain valid unless challenged in the Electoral Court and nullified or alternatively the candidate with the next highest number of votes behind the declared winner demands for a runoff on the grounds that the declared winner did not garner the requisite 50% plus one extra vote and thus cannot decline the runoff.

Where such demand is made it does not suspend the Chief Elections Officer’s prescribed specific performance of declaring the candidate with the greatest number of votes duly elected President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and proceed to gazette that result at the same time he will grant the runoff request and ensure it is staged within the prescribed time limit of 21 days.

That is the argument Jarvis put forward that Coltart is dismally failing to fault. The person with the greatest number of verified votes after the 29 March 2008 Presidential election ought to have been and still must be declared duly elected President of the Republic of Zimbabwe up to 11September 2008 when the election was set aside by mutual consent of the parties to the mediated settlement of the dispute.

That action is not necessary for academic reasons but will automatically nullify the 27 June 2008 election that was staged outside of legislated limits at the same time it will clarify the position with appointments Mugabe made to the Senate and Governorship before his position as President had been legitimised.

“In short there is a contradiction in the Electoral Act between Section 110 and the Second Schedule. The question is which provision prevails - Section 110 or the Second Schedule?” asked Senator Coltart.

Clearly the only conflict there is, is the attempt by Coltart to put words into Jarvis and use them to defend a cause that was never in dispute.

If after the Chief Elections Officer had declared Tsvangirai who had the greatest number of votes duly elected President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, based on the tallies he announced on 2 May 2008 but never gazetted, Mugabe had requested for a runoff election on account the tallies did not give Tsvangirai the 50% plus one extra vote necessary to avoid the runoff, then that request could not have been declined if it was made within 21 days of 29 March 2008 when the election was held.

However Professor Ncube could not have been legally correct to determine as he did that;
“You can’t remake the rules after the game. The game was that you had more than two players. One of the players had to get 50 + 1 percent for power to move to him. That did not happen---” as an incontestable legality.

Clearly the rules were remade by the Chief Elections Officer than by the contestants and for Prof Ncube mislead sympathy towards the villain instead of defend the victim is bad at law and morally at the same time it is political deceit and mischief on his part.

For a Legislator of the Upper House that we expect to scrutinise laws and ensure they are non partisan to support an opinion that is clearly flawed because it was made by someone who is in the leadership of the political formation he belongs to is alarming.

How many more bad laws will Hon Coltart support because they were proposed by his political associates and how many good laws will he oppose because they were proposed by his political opponents.

The Hon Senator, The Professors and The Hon Speaker-unholy alliances

Hon Moses Mzila Ndlovu MP

Hon Senator David Coltart believes that the entrenched belief that his faction is in league with Zanu PF has been created by media speculation over gagged MoU talks, propaganda issued by ZANU PF and statements made by leaders of the MDC formation led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC T).


He may have a point here but nothing can be further from the truth than the assertion that his formation is the only party to the MoU negotiations that has hitherto strictly upheld the agreement on secrecy of the talks and thus opened itself to victimisation by the statements and propaganda from the other parties to the talks.

If anything the faction that Senator Coltart belongs to has been most vocal about these talks. It was the first to announce its presence in South Africa for the initial round of negotiations mediated by President Mbeki.
That session passed without incident when negotiators broke off to consult with their principals.

It was during the second session that speculative reports about moles at the talks having been trapped and caught red handed were first pronounced and the propaganda was not directed at Senator Coltart’s formation but rather Tsvangirai’s when we were informed the mole was Theresa Makone.

The secrecy over the talks was compromised when another document was claimed to have been leaked by Tsvangirai’s negotiators detailing the framework of the proposed government and the global agreement.

The negotiations moved to Harare when it was speculated that President Mbeki was coming to conclude the talks immediately before Heroes day.

Senator Coltart’s principal Professor Arthur Mutambara fuelled the speculation when he pre-empted conclusion of the talks by issuing a Heroes Day commemoration message that was scathing about the role of western imperialists in pre-conditioning the outcome of the talks and its hypocrisy about sanctions and the land redistribution initiative.

Senator Coltart acknowledges this propaganda by Prof Mutambara calculated to harm Tsvangirai after he had walked out of the talks because he was not satisfied with a few issues that Prof Mutambara and Mugabe were amenable to.

Instead of classifying it as MDC M propaganda aimed at tarnishing Tsvangirai and project him in bad stead Senator Coltart labels this as “belligerent statements of Arthur Mutambara.”

Further to these belligerent views, Mutambara and Mugabe shared the podium at Heroes Acre the following day and Mugabe attacked Tsvangirai in the same vein Mutambara had done in his statement accusing Tsvangirai of dithering to sign the agreement and pandering to the whims of his Western handlers.

As Senator Coltart rightly observed many newspapers, took it as given that there was a deal reached between Mutambara and Mugabe because indeed there was and there still is a deal between them as Mutambara has consistently conceded that fact but denied having signed it even though he agreed with it.

But the real motive of Senator Coltart’s explanation was not to merely exonerate his faction from the widely held perception about its being in alliance with Zanu PF in the talks but rather to set the stage for demonising Tsvangirai and the MDC over the Parliamentary Speakership elections and pre-empt the determination the adjudicator must pass when the legal challenge over the election has been heard.

His motive was to cast aspersions over the election of Lovemore Moyo as the Speaker of Parliament and influence the outcome of any legal challenge on the matter.

"Whilst the existence of a deal has been emphatically denied, the controversy
surrounding the election of Speaker in the last week has served to enhance the perceptionthat there is some deal,” Coltart usefully disclosed the motive of his argument.

The Parliament Speaker elections only confirmed beyond reasonable doubt what the Zimbabweans have long concluded and that is Prof Mutambara and Prof Ncube are leaders of a counter revolutionary Zanu PF project to destabilise the MDC.

The project has been code named MDC to cause identity confusion with the people’s movement by the same name.

The State owned Herald broke the deal pact story and to date Zanu PF has not distanced itself from the deal with MDC PF. If anything Zanu PF has actually acted in conformity with the coalition pact between Prof Mutambara and President Mugabe.
The pact involved offering Mutambara’s faction the Speakership of Parliament, the Ceremonial Premiership, at least 10 Cabinet portfolios, 2 Governorships of Provinces, Understudy Diplomatic postings to all Western sited Zimbabwe embassies and 10 Permanent Secretaries of Ministries allocated to the faction and governmental representation at all fora where sanctioned ZANU PF stalwarts are barred.

Senator Coltart,Prof Jonathan Moyo and Moses Mzila Ndlovu were specifically earmarked for Ministerial appointments subject to Coltart’s Deputy Minister coming from Zanu PF.

For a faction whose top hierarchy was sent to the political dustbin by the electorate to emerge with such extensive political presence in government was irresistible for the novice Prof Mutambara and he capitulated to the demand by Zanu PF that all his faction had to do was enter into a coalition government with it that excluded Tsvangirai and his MDC.

To minimise public interest in the deal it was agreed to maintain the relationship as a gentleman’s agreement personally guaranteed by Mugabe. Gideon Gono and Professor Moyo and George Charamba played a pivotal role in convincing a suspicious Prof Mutambara that Mugabe was a man of his word and whatever he personally guarantees Zanu PF will not dare defy.

The faction was strictly instructed to publicly dissociate itself from both Zanu PF and MDC led by Tsvangirai and claim its relation with either Party was dependant on the business at hand but would always vote along with Zanu PF whenever need arose to pass a decision by vote in Parliament or in the Senate.

As a sign of goodwill to the pact Zanu PF withdrew the candidature of John Nkomo for the position of Speaker of Parliament and whipped its MP’s to vote for the candidate from Prof Mutambara’s MDC PF.

The verbal cooperation agreement between the formation led by Prof Mutambara and Zanu PF has been in place since 12 October 2005 and has always been closely safeguarded by liaison being carried privately through CIO conduits.

The ZimSentinel is in possession of some names of CIO operatives that were assigned to the project.

The defeat of Paul Themba Nyathi by Lovemore Moyo was thus a crashing blow to both Zanu PF and specific functionaries in the Party and the extension of the Party under Prof Mutambara’s stewardship.

Mugabe’s spokesman did not mince his words of displeasure with the development when he publicly chided Mutambara and Ncube in the following terms;

“I have deliberately deferred my thoughts on what Mutambara and Ncube must do to stave off a looming political tundra. My sources tell me there is fury in the camp. Sure, there should be. Who stomachs such contumely? But what is at stake calls for much more than fury. It requires decisiveness. As leaders of their faction, Ncube and Mutambara need to declare the rebel MPs outlaws.

They need to disown them through processes that should resonate in Parliament. Such as formally notifying the new Speaker about whom they have very little love, that the ten MPs crossed the floor that Monday. That immediately wipes out MDC-T’s newfound dominance by bribery.

That immediately precipitates a series of by-elections which the rebel MPs is sure to lose. Get it from me, neither MDC-T nor the rebel MPs have a stomach for by-elections just now. And of course such a development will create a new dynamic within MDC-T itself.

Can Ncube and Mutambara do it? I wonder. Or will they be pre-empted by an approach to the courts by the rebels, as is being mooted? Again, I wonder. Whichever way, speed and decisiveness is what is needed. And if the two men lack both, they might as well kiss kwaheri to politics. Or join Zanu-PF.”

The chilling message for Mutambara and Ncube was do anything and everything possible to reverse the election of Lovemore Moyo as Speaker of Parliament or abandon the MDC PF project and join the Zanu PF mainstream.

Failure to take action on the rebellion and its embarrassing consequences on Zanu PF and in particular President Mugabe will not escape Zanu PF sanction on the faction.
The litigation avenue had already been discussed with the faction and was not the most favoured by Mugabe.

But the fear was always there that the faction led by failed lawyers will resort to that recourse with disastrous political consequences and that is exactly what has happened when the faction settled for the misguided Court action in the High Court to set aside the Speaker’s election which on merits and procedure is fatally flawed and is destined to a dramatic collapse.

Excluding MDC from the Unity government would immediately free 13 Cabinet positions and 5 Deputy Ministerial positions for the Zanu PF and MDC PF coalition to parcel between them and Zanu PF was happy to parcel 7 of those to MDC PF and retain the 6 plus 5 Deputies.

That is why Professor Moyo has now publicly teamed up with Professor Ncube and Senator Coltart, whom he loathes with a passion, to craft the High Court challenge over the Speaker of Parliament’s election.

Sunday 28 September 2008

US Based Ddiplomats recalled as Scheduled Air Zimbabwe flight leaves 100 stranded to pick Mugabe and recalled US Diplomats

pic President Mugabe and Air Zimbabwe plane

The only direct flight into Harare by the economically marooned country’s national airline Air Zimbabwe left almost 100 passengers booked on its flight to Harare on Sunday 28 September 2008 stranded at London’s Gatwick Airport.


The direct flight’s schedule was altered at short notice to stopover in Egypt Cairo where it is expected to connect with a USA flight with President Mugabe’s shopping retinue of 54 that accompanied him to the 63rd United Nations (UN) General Assembly meeting in New York.

The weeklong escapade estimated to have left at the very least a US$ 2 000 000.00 hole in the fiscus of the impoverished State in airfares, accommodation, food and daily out of pocket subsistence allowances for Mugabe to deliver a 15 minute speech has been widely condemned by the country’s impoverished citizens of all walks.

The people are incensed that the insensitive despotic leader who lost the election in March and used brutal force to impose himself at State House, found it appropriate to abandon dicey power sharing talks that many hope will, if successfully completed, stop the haemorrhaging economy’s further decline and bring them overdue respite from unsustainable living conditions obtaining in the country.

In a country where the average income per month is no more than US$50.00 per month it is stupendously extravagant for a self imposed Head of State to squander US$2 000 000.00 of taxpayer funds with 54 of his cronies.

The returning retinue is reported to have allegedly swelled to 94 including 40 US based Zimbabwean diplomatic staff that have joined the President on his return trip.

Observers have quickly read into the move by President to empty the US Embassy of staff as an indication that the diplomats may have been recalled for debriefing on the new order under which those that will be allowed to retain posting will work.

“The move is the most significant indicator that the recently signed power sharing deal is very much alive despite scepticism over the hyped deadlock in key Ministerial allotment between the Parties,” commented one observer who witnessed the swelling Zimbabwe delegation throng the New York Airport.

It is widely believed that Zanu PF pliant diplomats will serve no meaningful purpose in Western Missions as they have tainted images and will not inspire confidence in those States that fundamental and irreversible power shift has taken place in the country in line with the agreement signed by the parties.

Such confidence is absolutely imperative to motivate desperately needed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to jumpstart the devastated economy.

The decision to divert the scheduled flight and leave behind 75% of the confirmed passengers at Gatwick will however immediately balloon the costs of President Mugabe’s trip to the UN by a further £100 000.00 in hotel bookings for the marooned passengers until Thursday when they will have to be accommodated in the next flight to Zimbabwe meaning further rescheduling of other booked passengers.

This kind of profligacy must be stopped by the transitional government if it is to make headway in turning around the economy.

President Mugabe must be brought to realise that being President does not entitle him to unchecked access to the fiscus and his international forays will be subjected to cost benefit analysis like hitherto has never happened during his tenure of office and he will be required to justify his expenses in terms of their returns to the country.

As it turns out all he has done is spend scarce forex to make a call for the lifting of sanctions none of the imposers have heeded.

Such calls could be more effectively made from Zimbabwe after he has moved the power sharing deal implementation to a point where the countries that imposed sanctions will be satisfied he will no longer be solely responsible for managing the State’s affairs with the impunity associated with his previous regimes.

But as the saying goes when one door is shut another opens and Zimbabweans will take solace in the recall of the diplomats from the US and hope the process will spread rabidly to other missions and new postings that reflect the spirit of the transitional power sharing deal in the country.

Saturday 27 September 2008

The Hon Senator, The Professors and Hon Speaker

pic
Hon Senator David Coltart

Hon Senator David Coltart’s “A perspective on the Zimbabwean talks and the election of the Speaker 3rd September 2008” has started his third term as a legislator as a high flyer headed for political misery of unimagined proportions.

He has inextricably fallen into a cobweb of political deceit, eliticism and downright confusion which is not representative of the wishes of the majority in his constituency.

After the tragic12 October 2005 split of the MDC National Executive into two factions with almost equal representation, Hon Coltart made the conscious decision to side with the Professor Welshman Ncube led splinter group having failed to mediate between the factions.

That was his first political miscalculation. The faction did not only fail to resonate with the grassroots support of the MDC despite its cynical decision to retain the original party name, symbol, slogan and regalia, but it also fared badly in the elections that were massively boycotted by the electorate.


It is not in dispute that it was the combined legal brains of Hon Coltart and Professor Welshman Ncube that prevailed on the rest in the faction to retain the original name, insignia, motto and regalia on account the factions had equal claim to the goodwill the party name had cultivated if not more for the splinter faction.

The political brinkmanship premised on legal supremacy within the faction over the faction that rallied behind founding Party President Morgan Tsvangirai that instructed the faction to seek legal remedies to complete their boardroom coup against Tsvangirai failed when the High Court dismissed an application to sanction the decision of the faction’s “Disciplinary Committee” to relieve Tsvangirai of his party membership and authority as Party President.

That was the second miscalculation involving Senator Coltart in the factional politics that had emerged in opposition politics. This was to be followed by hostilities between hitherto erstwhile political allies in the fractured Party which turned nasty and violent over assert splitting between the feuding parties.

Coltart’s close confidant in the faction then Hon Trudy Stevenson MP was severely assaulted by political thugs masquerading as Tsvangirai supporters and she fingered MDC youth leader the late Tonderai Ndira and others as the assailants.

They were promptly arrested and charged with the assault only to be released by the Courts when the State failed to produce evidence forming a prima facie case against the youths.

The sad period after the split saw the Ncube led faction go into overdrive vilification of Morgan Tsvangirai and his backers that was granted acres of space in State owned Print and Electronic broadcasting media.

Tsvangirai held onto the Party Head Quarters and several vehicles while the splinter faction grabbed the Cheque Book and Party operating account as well as the Bulawayo Party offices as it had the former Party National Treasurer and Secretary General- (mandated signatories of the account)- in its ranks.

As a consequence of that State Political Financing support was deposited into the account and the splinter faction with two authorised signatories accessed the funds and used them to finance its maiden Congress in February 2006.

Professor Arthur Guseni Oliver Mutambara was roped in from political wilderness and unveiled as the new President and leader of the breakaway MDC faction. That was the third miscalculation by the faction as it triggered discontent and some defections from the faction back to the original grouping.

The remnant MDC party organs had to reschedule their Congress to April to allow for gap filling in its structures for positions deserted by those that had teamed up with Professor Ncube.

Both factions reported resounding success of their Congresses but immediately thereafter they faced a popularity test in the Budiriro Constituency bye election. The seat formerly held by the combined MDC was to be contested by the two factions separately and Zanu PF which also fancied its chances competing against former allies turned political foes.

Tsvangirai’s candidate swept to victory with a landslide and the high level fielding by the breakaway faction now under Prof Mutambara’s stewardship, Gabriel Chaibva National Information and Publicity was pushed into a distant third place with a paltry 504 votes.

The party grassroots had settled the leadership contest by rallying behind founding President Morgan Tsvangirai and dissociating themselves from the splinter faction.
Many high level defections from the splinter faction back to the original party were witnessed but key faction figures like Secretary General Professor Ncube and former Party Vice President Gibson Sibanda, Treasurer Fletcher Dulini Ncube, Deputy Secretary General Priscilla Misihairambwi Mushonga, Paul Themba Nyathi and of course Hon Coltart braved this initial setback and hang on perilously to the leadership against the tide of discontent with their divisionist project.

After enduring a barrage of relentless criticism and realising their project was in trouble over impending March 2008 harmonised elections, the faction capitulated in April 2007 when its leadership announced it would support the sole opposition Presidential candidacy of Morgan Tsvangirai.

The announcement was made subject to the MDC led by Tsvangirai agreeing to a coalition pact accommodating the turbulent faction and allowing it dominion over Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.

The negotiations for the coalition pact collapsed in March 2007 when the turbulent faction made some unreasonable demands which were outrageous and devoid of merit and thus were rejected by the MDC under Tsvangirai as they sought to create an elitist political package that had no grassroots support basis.

The collapse incensed Professors Ncube and Mutambara prompting Prof Mutambara to pass the uncomplimentary “Tsvangirai is an indecisive political midget incapable of leading the MDC to electoral success in the impending 2008 harmonised elections” jibe.

He followed that up by pulling out his faction from associating with other opposition players under the Umbrella Save Zimbabwe Campaign (SCZ) that had drawn him and his faction closer to Tsvangirai and the original MDC when the President Mugabe had viciously scuttled a prayer meeting at Zimbabwe Grounds on 11 March 2007 killing Gift Tandare and arresting and thoroughly beating opponents in police custody.

The only notable opposition leaders to escape the police arrest or brutality after arrest were from Prof Mutambara’s faction. That raised heightened suspicion among grassroots opposition supporters that the Prof Mutambara led faction was a Zanu PF project to destabilise cohesion in opposition politics.

The vicious suppression of opposition politics in Zimbabwe by President Mugabe and his ruling Zanu PF elite attracted worldwide condemnation and escalated the long running political disputes in the country to the SADC Heads of State meeting which then resolved to mediate the crisis and appointed then South Africa President Thabo Mbeki its mediator in chief on Zimbabwe.

President Mbeki swiftly moved to formalise dialogue between the feuding Zimbabwe politicians and invited leaders of the then ruling Zanu PF Party and opposition MDC factions to South Africa for talks over the crisis gripping the country.

In doing so president Mbeki was relying on his previous knowledge from engaging the MDC and Zanu PF after the disputed 2001 Presidential elections that resulted in dialogue between the parties that was abandoned when Zanu PF ditched agreements reached and decided to go it alone in ruling the country.

In addition to that his decision to invite the breakaway MDC faction was also based on his personal dislike of Morgan Tsvangirai for his lack of advanced academic achievement and his affinity to the Matabeleland tribes whose leadership formed the majority in the breakaway MDC faction and are direct descendants of South African Tribes that fled North into Zimbabwe during the Tshaka dynasty conquest wars and his personal closeness to Mugabe and Prof Welshman Ncube.

It is widely held in the country that President Mbeki was never in the mediation process as an impartial moderator but with the mission to assist Zanu PF dismantle the MDC whose growing stature in Zimbabwe was having a contagious effect in politicising the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) that could shift the balance of power in his country’s politics.

In addition it is widely believed that President Mbeki saw Tsvangirai as the embodiment of resistance to continued Zanu PF supremacy in Zimbabwe and impossible of reconciling with Mugabe which could be much easier if Prof Mutambara and Ncube were catapulted to eclipse his popularity in opposition politics as they were closer to Mugabe’s ideology than Tsvangirai.

Those negotiations managed to clear the way for a reasonably violent free harmonised election and the legislation of Constitutional Amendment No 18 (CA No 18) that saw electoral rigging through rigging and ballot stuffing severely curtailed.

In January 2008 the breakaway faction led by Prof Mutambara realising it would never win the elections on its own and that most of its senior executives from the Northern constituencies would be ditched by the electorate attempted to resuscitate the alliance with the original party by yet again endorsing support the sole candidacy of Morgan Tsvangirai for President in return for 70% uncontested fielding in Matabeleland and Midlands areas while contesting 30% of Mashonaland Manicaland and Masvingo provinces.

Once again it was the proposal fell through when it was determined that the MDC breakaway faction was not in command of the support it claimed in Matabeleland worse so in the Midlands, Masvingo, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces.

The leadership of the faction was severely hurt by the close failure of its deceitful project to succeed at the last meeting and vilified Tsvangirai as having been bribed by Zanu PF.

They announced that their President Prof Mutambara would therefore contest for the country’s Presidency against Tsvangirai and Mugabe.

On the eve of the sitting of the Nomination Court for the harmonised elections Prof Mutambara chickened out of the Presidential race instead endorsing the candidature of Dr Simba Makoni who had decided to run against his Party leader whom he accused of having unprocedurally circumvented internal contestation to represent the Party at its Congress.

Many eyebrows were raised why a Party opposing Zanu PF would decide to support a Zanu PF dissident Presidential contestant who had only been in the main arena for no more than 56 days before the elections if the Party was not in alliance with Zanu PF.

After picking up hints from his recent SW Radio Africa debate with Brian Kagoro , Hon Senator Coltart decided it was time to set the record of his faction straight and dispel some widely held perceptions about his party that were impacting negatively on it.

After the elections were held and it became apparent Tsvangirai had beaten Mugabe in the Presidential contest and his Legislative and Local Governance candidates had humbled both Zanu PF and MDC PF contestants throughout the country, presidential contestants Mugabe, Towungana and Dr Makoni did not concede defeat there and then as was expected.

Dr Makoni whom the faction supported started proposing a Government of National Unity (GNU) instead of conceding defeat and congratulating Tsvangirai notwithstanding he had not managed to poll 10% of the valid vote.

The call was made before even the official results were made public confirming that Mutambara, Makoni and Mugabe were in league with each other to stop Tsvangirai’s ascendancy to the Presidency regardless of what the results of the election were.

And when 33 days after the Presidential election the official results were released by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) confirming Tsvangirai had won the election albeit with disputed final tallies that ZEC refused verification of in terms of the law, Mugabe conceded defeat and accepted the runoff contest created by the disputed figures.

Towungana never said a word while Dr Simba Makoni yapped about the GNU to the extent that when the dispute was referred to SADC at its emergency meeting in Lusaka Makoni was there despite results ruling him out of any further interest in the contest.
When SADC exerted pressure on Tsvangirai to contest the runoff on guarantees of full monitoring and equal freedom to campaign it was only then that the devious Prof Mutambara rushed to South Africa to congratulate Tsvangirai and promise him support in the runoff.

The motive was clear that the balance of power was gravitating in Tsvangirai’s favour and any opportunities of political accommodation were in league with his main wing of the Party.

Mugabe then rolled out his vicious military campaign that left no less than 130 MDC activists dead in its wake and Tsvangirai promptly pulled out of the runoff when it became apparent SADC were not in a position to live up to their guarantees about the election runoff.

On 27 June Mugabe was the sole contestant in the race and romped to a landslide “85% victory” according to ZEC figures this time availed within 2 days of the election having been staged.

The same process had not been possible of conclusion in 32 days when Mugabe had been thoroughly beaten to the post by Tsvangirai.

The election process and its results were widely condemned as a sham by the SADC and AU observers Mugabe had selectively accredited at the exclusion of local monitors who had been credited to observe the election during the first round but were barred from the second round observation of the continuing election.

But the prevaricating Prof Mutambara was there at Mugabe’s 6th coronation as President represented by the party spokesman Gabriel Chaibva of the 504 votes Budiriro by election firm signalling a shift yet again in the faction to Mugabe’s side.

Prof Mutambara was taken aback by the barrage of criticism that visited his faction as a consequence of Chaibva’s endorsement of Mugabe’s legitimacy against the international condemnation of the process leading to his “election”.

He promptly relieved Chaibva of his responsibility as faction spokesman but he had done enough to be secretly assigned the Zanu PF ambassadorship to convince vocal neighbouring Botswana to endorse Mugabe’s re-election which later earned him deportation and prohibited immigrant status from that principled country.

A week later it was the turn of Prof Mutambara, Prof Ncube and Welshman Ncube to endorse Mugabe’s re-election when they stealthily went to State House to pay homage to Mugabe in the presence of President Mbeki who was enroute to the G8 summit in Japan where the Zimbabwe electoral impasse was to feature prominently and he wanted to take evidence with him that he was still in charge of ongoing mediation of the crisis.

Any previous concealment of what the faction stood for was left bare for all to see. Furtive denials and explanations of the embarrassing episode by the faction would not wash with a distrusting electorate.

After the G8 international public condemnation of Mugabe’s electoral malfeasances that had started at the AU’s Heads of State meeting in Egypt and continued in Japan was escalated to the UN Security Council where the motion to impose international sanctions against the Junta regime led by Mugabe was supported by the requisite 9 members only to collapse when China and Russia vetoed.

After that near escape President Mbeki prevailed on cornered Mugabe to resume mediated dialogue with political opponents that he had ditched when he defiantly proceeded with the sham runoff on 27 June that failed to gain him recognition and he again invited the original group of negotiators notwithstanding that the election had proved the irrelevance of the Mutambara faction.

Attempts to coerce Tsvangirai to sign up to an exclusively President Mbeki chaired mediated process was vigorously resisted until the Sadc Heads off State conceded to the request to expand the mediation to include AU and UN representatives whereupon parties signed up to a Memorandum of Understanding on 23 June 2008 setting the stage for full fledged negotiations on power sharing to commence in earnest.

What followed the negotiations was that there arose a stalemate on the roles of Mugabe and Tsvangirai in the transitional government apropos at the talks and President Mbeki had to personally intervene to salvage the talks with a proposal that was declined by Tsvangirai who rightly observed it was heavily in favour of Mugabe and Zanu PF despite them having lost elections to him and his MDC Party respectively.

Tsvangirai stormed out of the negotiations in protest of what later emerged to have been a ganging up between President Mbeki, Mugabe and Mutambara against him to accept a ceremonial Premiership position in the transitional government.

The State owned Herald Newspaper reported that Mugabe and Prof Mutambara had struck a deal where they would form the next Government excluding Tsvangirai and his MDC formation.

President Mbeki would not deny the pact having been reached outside the negotiations before him but Prof Mutambara hurriedly called a Press conference to refute the allegations but only managed to do exactly the opposite when he lost his emotion and accused Tsvangirai of dithering to sign the agreement he and Mugabe considered fair in the circumstances.

In the spirit of the alliance between Mugabe and Prof Mutambara the later issued a hard hitting Heroes Day holiday solidarity message that exalted Mugabe and the heroic achievements of the Liberation struggle he directed and slamming Western governments hypocrisy over sanctions and demands that power negotiations must reflect the people’s will as reflected in the March 29 elections outcome.

He attacked Tsvangirai indirectly as a stooge of the Western governments in sync with Mugabe’s favourite line of political demagoguery he has used since his regime was slapped with travel sanctions for political intolerance and human rights abuses.

The dispute was back at the SADC Heads of Government meeting in South Africa where Tsvangirai again refused to sign and argued for a role reversal with Mugabe if the Heads of Government felt it was equitable in power share allotted to him and Mugabe.
Mugabe was livid when the counter proposal for role reversal was tabled to him confirming to the SADC Heads that there was something amiss in the proposal.

Sadc Heads of State minus Botswana allowed Mugabe to convene swear in elected Parliamentarians elected in March as their election was not in dispute but he misread that approval and proceeded to convene parliament the day after the swearing in ceremony.

It turned out that prior to the Parliamentary Speaker elections on 25 September 2008 Zanu PF and MDC PF together with Independent Tsholotsho North MP Professor Jonathan Moyo had caucused and agreed that Zanu PF would not field a candidate for the Speakership but would rally behind the MDC PF candidate and once they push through his election they would form a substantive coalition government minus Tsvangirai and his MDC.

Mugabe had threatened to form that government unless Tsvangirai signed up to the deal that he and Professor Mutambara had endorsed.

Paul Themba Nyathi was offered by the alliance after the Zanu PF preferred candidate John Nkomo was withdrawn after Professor Moyo had threatened to vote for the Tsvangirai endorsed candidate in retaliation for Nkomo’s previous disrespect of his person.

He was soundly beaten by MDC’s Lovemore Moyo after the Party had also caucused with elected MP’s in the MDC faction who do not want the risk of being aligned with Zanu PF which has a ruthless reputation of genocide in their constituencies.

That result delivered a shattering blow to the cynical political agenda between Mugabe and Professors Mutambara and Ncube.

Mugabe was forced to open Parliament with a salute to the hostile MDC Speaker and mayhem broke in the August house when the MDC MP’s heckled and jeered him throughout his speech and handed him and their Speaker a petition querying the legitimacy of Mugabe in their August house when his election was in dispute.

That did the trick. President Mbeki was forced to revive the stalled mediated talks he had suspended when Mugabe had promised SADC heads that he would steer out of trouble through the Parliament alliance he had struck with professor Mutambara that would give him the coalition majority necessary to form a government.

When he turned up for the 7th September round of talks he tabled a two tier power structure that gave Tsvangirai the Government Supervision powers he desired and Mugabe the State supervision powers he will die to retain to his grave and stated he was not leaving for his country without agreement regardless of how long it took to secure it. That was more like it.

The deal was signed much to the relief of President Mbeki who unbeknown to the parties in Zimbabwe negotiations had been told by his ANC Party in South Africa to secure the deal or never return as the crisis was threatening the 2010 World Football extravagance awarded to the country being moved to another country over insecurity caused by the Zimbabwe crisis.

He got the deal but it cost him his job as President of South Africa because no sooner had he touched down home soil with the Zimbabwe crisis resolution agreement in place than he was slapped with a recall notice from his ANC principals or face a vote of no confidence motion.

He promptly resigned. The recall was attributed to political gerrymandering with the prosecution of the Party President but runs deeper than that as it threatened the country’s stability if the World Football Cup was to be moved to another country over Mbeki’s failure in reigning in Mugabe’s excesses.

These are the facts Hon Coltart tried to spin around and use to create a favourable impression of his faction that is, has been and will always be in league with Zanu PF.

The reasons why Hon Coltart embarked on the faction image cleansing mission was to prepare groundwork for the real business of the Professors as mandated by the faction sponsors in Zanu PF and that is to reverse the election of Lovemore Moyo as Parliament Speaker by setting the platform on which whoever will preside over the matter will have to work from.

The Zimsentinel will expose that in the next post

Thursday 25 September 2008

The Zimbabwe Power Sharing Agreement

pic. Sadc Mediator and Former RSA President Thabo Mbeki
On 11 September 2008 three Political Party Presidents endorsed a political settlement aimed at rescuing Zimbabwe out of the Social, Political and economic quagmire.

Only the leaders of political formations that managed to win more than one parliamentary seat during the 29 march 2008 elections were considered representative enough to qualify as signatories to the agreement.

The negotiations were necessitated by a hugely unpopular decision by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission to declare Morgan Tsvangirai winner of the 29 march 2008 presidential election but without an absolute majority to be declared duly elected president.

A Presidential runoff election was ordered instead. Not only was the runoff ordered out of time but it was ordered in circumstances where the outcome announced was seriously in doubt and verification was rendered impossible as the electoral Commission displayed all signs it had lost control of the electoral process to the Joint Operations commission and Zanu PF.

Concerned about the challenges the country had faced and the multiple threats to the well-being of the people the UN, AU and SADC resolved that settlement be through mediation led by South Africa President Thabo Mbeki to permanently resolve these challenges.

So it was that the three political parties that won Legislative seats were invited to enter into dialogue aimed at resolving the disputed Presidency of the country after the electoral process that led to the 27 June 2008 “re-election” of Mugabe in a solo contest after leading contender Morgan Tsvangirai had withdrawn his candidacy citing violence and conditions unfit to hold a credible election.

The negotiations over a five week period from 23 July 2008 culminated in the signing of the Power Sharing Deal between the Parties by their Presidents on 11 September 2008.

Initially negotiations had been planned to last two weeks but serious disputes emerged over the powers each signatory would realize from the political deal and in particular between Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe thereby prolonging the negotiations up to 11 September 2008 when the framework of the agreement was signed and even then the finer details still remain to be thrashed out.

An analysis of the agreements reached reveals that;

ARTICLE I
The "Agreement" was signed by the representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively ("the Parties") in fulfillment of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary Summit on 29th March 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted by the African Union Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt.

The agreement was on the new Government to be set up in terms of this Agreement.

COMENT

Clearly the agreement does not derive any legitimacy from the Zimbabwe laws. Rather it was forced down the throats of Zimbabwean political leaders by SADC without reference to the legal requirements of the Country’s supreme law prescriptions when such disputes arise.

The Sadc resolution was unprecedented in its membership but closely follows on a similar solution for the Kenya disputed Presidency. It can be safe to concluded that the deal has no legal basis but is politically binding and enforceable not in terms of Zimbabwean laws but in terms of SADC security, defense and politics protocols.

This is a critical element underpinning this agreement. Zimbabwe security and law enforcement agents have no role to play in influencing the outputs of this agreement and should they decide to mutiny or revolt against it they will be revolting against SADC, AU and the UN.
It is highly unlikely the Zimbabwe Security forces would want to engage in a war with SADC forces that can simply close the landlocked country’s borders and leave the security forces the daunting task of dealing with the disenchanted populace.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby declared and agreed to work together to create a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country.

COMENT

It is not clear what this clause implies because it is pregnant with high sounding rhetoric but empty in meaning. What is a genuine, viable, permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation?

What does “implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country,” mean in real terms?

These sweeping statements are difficult to hold parties to account and for the generality of the people worthless.

Does haggling for a particular ministry by any of the parties constitute a nationally acceptable solution?

Does the nation want to be permanently governed by SADC negotiated governments or do they want to elect their own government.

This section is not very smart and is difficult to evaluate performance there on based to determine levels of success.

ARTICLE III

The Parties agree to:

(a) Give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe through the Government leading the process of developing and implementation of an economic recovery strategy and plan. The parties committed themselves to work together on a full and comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy, which will urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.

(b) Create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural season is productive.

(c) Establish a National Economic Council composed of representatives of the Parties and of the following sectors:
(i) Manufacturing
(ii) Agriculture
(iii) Mining
(iv) Tourism
(v) Commerce
(vi) Financial
(vii) Labour
(viii) Academia; and
(ix) Other relevant sectors

(d) Make the terms of reference of the Council include giving advice to Government, formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by government and such other functions as are assigned to the Council by the Government.

(e) Endorse the SADC resolution on the economy.

COMENT

The parties basically agreed that the economy of the country will henceforth be driven by the policies formulated by the National Economic Council.

The government however still retained the prerogative to assign the Council functions which is no different to how the consecutive Zanu PF regimes have been working with the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF).

It is unlikely there will be significant changes to the economic misfortunes of the country unless there is a significant paradigm shift in Government’s top/bottom approach to economic management.

The SADC resolution on the economy is not known to the people of Zimbabwe and therefore will not be owned and driven by them.

This government will not address the economic malaise in the country by upholding high sounding SADC economic rhetoric instead of agreeing to heed the concerns of its Nationals and modeling its economic programmes around those concerns.

ARTICLE IV

Parties recognized and acknowledged that some sections of the international community have since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe, which have included targeted sanctions.

The Parties further noted the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the United Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International Community was over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme.

In particular parties acknowledged sanctions and measures imposed on Zimbabwe that:

(a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by the United States of America Congress which outlawed Zimbabwe's right to access credit from International Financial Institutions in which the United States Government is represented or has a stake;

(b) suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights, suspension of balance of payment support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources and suspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund;

(c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe by The World Bank; and

(d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some business leaders.

Parties noted that international isolation has over the years created a negative international perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation of the country by the non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some sections of the international community.

Parties acknowledged the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further decline of the economy.

Parties then expressed the desire and commitment to bring to an end the resultant fall in the standards of living of the people by agreeing to;
(a) endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe;

(b) have all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe; and

(c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country's international isolation.

COMMENT

The SADC resolution on sanctions is that the punitive measures imposed against Zanu PF must be lifted as they are causing undue economic hardships in the country.

Having accurately identified the reasons why the sanctions were imposed the negotiators disappointed by prescribing a narrow solution which is outside their span of control to implement.

It the sanctions were imposed over issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over the land reform programme, which is an accurate assessment, how will endorsement of a SADC resolution calling for their lifting achieve that desirable end?

The agreement ought to have spelt out tacitly that the endorsement of the call to have sanctions lifted will be supported by deliberate action on the part of the New Government to;
• ensure transparency in electoral processes by allowing whoever doubted the process freedom to monitor the elections
• uphold and respect electoral outcomes within the shortest possible period from the date they are held
• adhere to legislated electoral provisions without recourse to illegal gerrymandering with the system to achieve a desired outcome that may not have been endorsed by the electorate
• uphold human rights to the letter of all ratified conventions and the country’s Constitutional provisions
• desist from selective application of the country’s laws on the grounds of race, colour, creed, political affiliation, sex and religion
• correct the disputed issues that discredited the noble objectives land reform programme and ensure ownership rights in title to whatever government legitimately desired to expropriate are compensated for at fair market values at the time of expropriation and in the case of delayed compensation in the land reforms in the country there will be retroactive compensation from the State and
• ensure expropriated land will be transparently allocated to the needy and profitably used to guarantee the country’s food self sufficiency.

Unless these drivers of sanctions are addressed, agreement to call for the lifting of punitive measures before addressing the motive behind the measures will not change anything.

As it turns out the noble cause to have the sanctions lifted is being sabotaged by the rhetoric of President Mugabe at the signing ceremony that fails to inspire confidence in the changes necessary to persuade the lifting of the sanctions.

ARTICLE V

Parties recognised that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post independence period were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice.

They noted that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle.

Parties accepted the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address the issues of equity, productivity, and justice.
They acknowledged their differences on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution that took place from the year 2000.

Despite those differences parties accepted the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution.

Parties further noted that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft Constitution agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating former land owners for land acquired rests on the former colonial power.

Further and in recognition of the need to ensure that all land is used productively in the interests of all the people of Zimbabwe as well as the special need for women to access and control independent land ownership the Parties agreed to;

• conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships;
• ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or political affiliation;
• ensure security of tenure to all land holders;
• call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement;
• work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers and;
• work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land.

COMMENT

The agreement by the Parties herein is tacit and allows for no ambiguity in its interpretation and purpose.

Having agreed that the primary responsibility to compensate the dispossessed colonial owners of the land albeit based on content of a draft Constitution of the Parties that is yet to be made public, approved and adopted and which draws heavily from a controversial amendment to the current Constitution it is not clear how the obligation for the New Government to secure international support land reforms compensation arises.

Clearly the government attempt to abdicate on responsibilities to uphold land ownership rights enshrined in the current Constitution which the amendment to allow for arbitrary land repossession without compensation dismally failed to pass onto the British in the period it has been on our statutes will not work because of the number of times it has been repeated.

The pragmatic action in this regard which is in the control of the New government is to audit the land allocation that has hitherto taken place and ensure it is equitable and just and inclusive of needy women.

In addition to that it is heart warming to know that Parties agreed that security of tenure would be extended to legitimate beneficiaries of the land distribution that took place from 2000 provided that the owners are using the land productively for the benefit of the country.

The marshalling of compensation funds for former owners and support for new farmers will be made easier if the beneficiaries are deemed to be legitimate and needy and their commitment to productive commercial usage of the land is not in question.

To that end it is imperative for the new government not to waste any more time than has already been to secure funding for the next agricultural season that is no more than a month from now if agricultural productive capacity of the nation is to be restored forthwith.

But we are witnessing political dithering on the part of the Parties to set up the Cabinet that will drive this important initiative forward and can be excused for thinking that the lack of political will to set up the agreed upon Government is indicative of the extent to which the agreement will fail.

ARTICLE VI

In the agreement Parties Acknowledged that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a constitution by themselves and for themselves and in that awareness they must not only drive the process but inclusively and democratically own it as well.

Parties recognised that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the people of Zimbabwe.

They acknowledged the existence of the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, which was supposed to be annexed to the agreement under scrutiny marked Annexure "B" but is not yet in the public domain to date.

Guided by their determination to create conditions conducive for people to write the constitution for themselves and mmindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of full citizenship and equality of women, the Parties hereby agreed that;

- they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the Parties
- they shall mandate the Select Committee to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist it in performing its mandate herein;
- the Select Committee holds such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe;
- the Select Committee convenes an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their representation in the sub-committees referred to above and such related matters as may assist the committee in its work;
- the Select Committee tables its draft Constitution at a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference and
- reports to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution for Zimbabwe.

The Parties further agreed that the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to a referendum and that for implementation of the agreement on Constitution making the specific timeframe shall be;

i. the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new government;
ii. the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the date of the appointment of the Select Committee;
iii. the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 4 months after the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference;
iv. the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference;
v. the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference;
vi. the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and such debate concluded within one month;
vii. the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a referendum;
viii. a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the conclusion of the debate;
ix. in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be gazetted within 1 month of the date of the referendum and;
x. the draft Constitution Bill shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting.

COMMENT

The detailed Constitution making process in the agreement is a welcome departure from the brevity that characterised many failed attempts to re-write our Constitution in the past.

What however must raise eyebrows is the reference to a Kariba draft Constitution agreed upon by the Parties which Zimbabweans in their majority are not familiar with.

What is the purpose of that draft if it will not be revealed to the All Stakeholders Conference and how will variations from that document emerging from the All Stakeholders Conference draft Constitution impact on the agreement between the Parties?

On the whole the programmed steps towards Constitution re-writing are a welcome development that must be implemented forthwith.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties agreed that the new Government:
 will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all;
 will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to correct historical imbalances in the development of regions;
 shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what measures might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre and post independence political conflicts and;
 will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation;
 will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled personnel.

COMMENT

A cursory glance at the Bill of rights in the current Zimbabwe Constitution shows that there is no variation between what Parties agreed upon and what is already provided for therein.

The only significant variation is the special provision directed at encouraging the return to the country by Zimbabweans displaced into the Diaspora.

The agreement ought to have answered why the same entrenched rights in the current Constitution were not being upheld to the extent of necessitating their re-statement in this latest agreement?

Agreement should thus have been focussed on reining into line those law enforcement agencies that have disallowed the upholding of these fundamental rights.

Citizenship and Electoral laws that criminalises dual citizenship and disenfranchises Zimbabweans resident outside the country’s borders should have been identified as the major cause why citizens feel unfairly treated by their government and therefore needing redress to make the country an attractive place of residence for all its citizens.

ARTICLE VIII


In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties agreed:

• on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols, national programmes and events and;
• that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion have the right to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events without let or hindrance.

COMMENT

Why Parties in their wisdom or lack of it felt it desirerable to agree on fundamentally basic identity issues such as National institutions, symbols, national programmes and events beats imagination.

The problem with this section of the agreement is the undertones it carries. Zimbabwe has institutionalized Party political slogans, Party flags, political office and political Party historical landmarks and Congresses to National emblems and symbols that determine one’s patriotism and consequently freedoms that can accrue or punishment that can be meted out to none compliant citizens.

Laws that deny citizens the right to publicly discuss the failures of their national leadership as if they were Gods and talking bad about them is blasphemous are the motive behind this agreement.

When ruling parties monopolise National events to their ownership the events lose weight and deserve to be criticized by all right thinking Zimbabweans.

The office of the President, Prime Minister and any other political office for that matter is a public office and incumbents must be thoroughly subjected to private and public life scrutiny by those they lead to curtail power delinquency in holders.

Holidays like Unity day, Heroes Day, Defense Forces day are too politicized to the extent that they engender a feeling of resentment by those citizens they exclude for political reasons.

When one political formation uses these occasions to reward people that have no regard for human rights they infuriate victims of the system and alienate them from such events.

No citizens must be compelled by political agreement to celebrate or worship an event that is meaningless to him.

Such level of fundamentalism is counterproductive as it aims at coercing compliance instead of motivating compliance.

ARTICLE IX

The Parties reaffirmed the principle of the United Nations Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries and agreed:

• that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe vests exclusively on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe through peaceful, democratic and constitutional means;
• to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing governments and;
• that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe.

Clearly this clause was necessitated by the deeply held belief in one political formation that it was being vilified by the citizens incited by foreign nations interests in the country.

The cynical underlying assumption appears to be that Zimbabweans will never out of their own volition desire political leadership change in their country which is outrageous.

The Zimbabweans are not subjected to any more external pressures than any other developing country and the citizens are literate enough to realise when a regime is no longer serving its purpose.
Zimbabwe has external interests of its own that it promotes through acceptable advocacy means and vice versa for countries with interests in its borders.

Parties are not sincere in this agreement. They want international help to prop up internal governance projects but do not want the helpers to object to internal miss-governance when it occurs in the country despite having ratified the international conventions used to back-up such criticism.

Any political agreement that aims at restricting citizens from demanding change in governance practice and players is undemocratic and must be dismissed with the contempt it deserves.

People of Zimbabwe must be free to choose their government yes but they equally must be allowed to learn from the best practices globally and one such practice severely missing in Zimbabwe is regime change.

The agreement should have addressed why people will be persuaded to consider regime change if they are happy with their government and agreed measures to counter such poisonous influences rather than defend the right to life incumbency of public office by labelling any disagreements with that foreign persuasion.

ARTICLE X

In the agreement Parties recognised that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the cornerstone of any multi-party democratic system and in turn have agreed that there should be free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political parties are able to propagate their views and canvass for support, free of harassment and intimidation.

COMMENT

Once again it’s not as if this clause is novel to this agreement. If anything it is a fundamental right in the current Zimbabwe Constitution that needs no new agreement.

The agreement on this section fell short of expectations of many who are denied to freely assemble and discuss politics by the State.

What should have been agreed is how the State institutions currently being used to deny people realization of this fundamental right must be forced to uphold it.

A good starting point would have been to agree that the right to political assembly must never be authorized by anyone but rather triggered by the political issue uniting nationals in debate.

To that law enforcement presence must always be guaranteed for any peaceful political assembly at the shortest of notice even if it means expanding policing institutions to have a standby unit for the eruption of spontaneous political demonstrations.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties herein agreed that it is the duty of all political parties and individuals to:

• respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land;
• adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law.

COMMENT

While agreeing to be bound by this agreement in Constituting a new Government it never crossed the minds of the Parties that this entire agreement is in itself a classical example of failure on their part to respect the Constitution and other laws and adhere to the principle of the rule of law by one or all the parties to the negotiations.

The only reason why government formation became the subject of political Party negotiation instead of an electoral mandate is because the same Parties subscribing to this clause had refused and or failed to uphold the country’s electoral laws.

Such is the deceit in politics that politicians get plaudits for breaching the very essence of the concept they are preaching.

To my mind this was the most ludicrous component of the agreement. Why agree on something that has long been agreed upon and set aside at implementation? What guarantees are there that this agreement will not be overlooked as has happened in this instant?

It can’t be the involvement of SADC and AU in underwriting this agreement because the same institutions have binding conventions that were breached by the refusal to live by the Zimbabwe electoral laws by the same Parties that it did not invoke in this instant.

A bit of political honesty will not harm anyone.

ARTICLE XII

In recognition of the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in a multi-party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in a free, peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties have agreed:
• to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation and realisation of the right to freedom of association and assembly and;
• that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security legislation.

COMMENT

Granted at the time negotiations were entered into emotions were running high after the traumatic experience the country had witnessed post the March 29 elections and could have clouded the open thinking of the Parties.

The agreement in Article X is no different to the issues in this Article. The addition that the New Government will undertake training programs, workshops and meetings for the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of the provisions of security legislation is to say the least naïve.

The law enforcement and security agents in the country are thoroughly conversant with best practice application of the same legislation the agreement wants to waste resources in addressing in the manner envisaged above which will not achieve the desired result.

The problem in law enforcement agencies is not the lack of knowledge about how the laws must apply but rather entrenched political mischief by the forces motivated by benefits that accrue to their top leadership out of patronage to a corrupt system of governance in place.

A paradigm shift from those values in the security ministries that motivate them to deliberately miss-apply laws selectively can only be achieved if the commanders are held accountable for the inconsistent actions of their subordinates that vitiate fundamental human rights.

No amount of training or talk shops will correct the misdemeanours in security ministries unless the code of their conduct is strictly enforced from top to bottom including dismissing culprits summarily if they do not tow the line.

That is what should have been agreed upon rather than waste resources training political malcontents leading the forces.

ARTICLE XIII

Parties correctly noted that State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties.

For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed that the following steps be taken:

• that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces of the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party democratic system;
• ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the Rule of Law and remain non-partisan and impartial;
• laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour and;
• recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political or other form of favouritism is practiced.

COMMENT

This Article is a further expansion of Articles X and XII. Security Commanders that declare political interest in their conduct will not be debriefed and re-oriented by some training program to practice fair recruitment and uphold human rights that are at variance with their ingrained political beliefs.

They will only respond positively to disciplinary measures and or political sanction. After rumbling around the issues the Parties finally got to the crux of the matter when they agreed to ensure laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and those violating them be penalised without fear or favour

In that statement lays the solution to the mischief the Security Commanders have displayed hitherto.

ARTICLE XIV

Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community leaders with equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their communities regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political affiliation, the Parties agreed to:-

 commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders and;
 call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at national level as well as in their communities.

COMMENT

The Chiefs are not partisan out of choice but because of the political system under which they serve that dolls numerous incentives for them to behave as they do.

An opportunity was lost to address the problem by addressing the actors instead of the principals that order traditional leaders to act as they do.

Their presence in the Senate should have been revisited and in particular the voting rights they carry in that house despite that they are not democratically elected to represent the electorate in that House. Their presence in debate is not an issue but their persuasion to vote along with the ruling party is what must be addressed and the surest way is to withdraw their voting rights so that they will be forced to truly and honestly represent their subjects and not seek favours with the ruling elite.




ARTICLE XV

Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which inculcates the values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non-violence, openness, democracy, equality, justice and respect and;

Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community service, skills development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe Parties agreed that:

 all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political affiliation are eligible to participate in national youth training programmes;
 the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non-partisan manner and shall not include partisan political material advancing the cause of any political party and;
 while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth training centres have a right to hold political opinions, they shall not, during the period of their training, collectively and as part of a scheme of the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work.

COMMENT

The agreement in this section is couched in dishonest political jargon. The Youths trained in these institutions have been fingered in numerous heinous crimes against humanity and the Training needs to be abolished.

ARTICLE XVI

Parties accurately observed that in times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and food assistance from the State and further that;

It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean who needs humanitarian and food assistance receives it.

Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food assistance do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or advance the interests of any political party or cause and agreed that;

• in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State Institutions and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food assistance without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation or religion;
• humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental Organisations, shall be provided without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion.
• all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be allowed to render such assistance as might be required.
• all NGO's rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate within the confines of the laws of Zimbabwe.

COMMENT

Food is a fundamental prerequisite for livelihood and must never be allowed to be used for political ends.

The agreement should have noted that when people are starved by any regime they will revolt and demand regime change with or without external influence to demand for that kind of change.

ARTICLE XVII

The Parties agreed that:
 the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and spirit of this agreement;
 the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures which may become necessary to implement the Government's agreed policies and in particular, with a view to entrenching democratic values and practices.

COMMENT

Given that the Parties were negotiating formation of an institution of governance that is outside the confines of the country’s Constitution because of legal and Constitutional paralysis that had gripped the country due to disputed electoral results it is surprising that the parties did not find it proper to set a timeframe in which the legislature would regularise the agreement.

As it turns out the lack of a legal framework to regularise the formation of a government in line with the agreement is now proving to be a critical stumbling block in moving the process forward.

ARTICLE XVIII

Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends;

Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence;

Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred and polarisation within the country;

Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence as a people and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices, the Parties agreed;

 to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non-violence and dialogue as means of resolving political differences;
 to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends;
 that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book;
 that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit themselves to do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State actors and shall consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence;
 to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence.
 that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to a political party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any other form of intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or oppose any political party or to achieve any political end;
 to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property;
 to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe return home and their enjoyment of the full protection of the law;
 to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other.
 that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the principles of the rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the determination as to whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons accused of politically related offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections.

COMMENT

If all these issues were not being addressed to the extent of them needing to be incorporated in an agreement between political Parties then what sort of a regime was at the helm of our National management and did it not deserve to be changed without any external influences.

Were all these misdemeanors permissible in the past to warrant them being visited in a power sharing agreement?

If not what is required to ensure causes that led to their manifestation will be kept in check? That is what should have been agreed upon and not what is herein contained.

All these vices have long been outlawed but some people get away with them because of political affiliation. That is the reason why punishing law enforcement authorities who ignore breaches were most imperative as it addresses the continuation of these political malpractices.

ARTICLE XIX

Freedom of Expression and Communication

Parties recognised the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi-party democracy.

They noted that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been issued.

The Parties are aware of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe, some of which are funded by foreign governments.

They were concerned that the failure to issue licences under the Broadcasting Services Act to alternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe.
Further concerned that foreign government funded external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe's national interest.

Parties expressed desire to ensure the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation of as many media houses as possible and agreed:
 that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the appropriate authorities of all applications for re-registration and registration in terms of both the Broadcasting Services Act as well as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act;
 that all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running external radio stations be encouraged to make applications for broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms of the law;
 that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this Agreement, the Parties thereby:-
(i) called upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding;
(ii) encouraged the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and
(d) resolved that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to all political parties for their legitimate political activities.
(e) resolved that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that unfairly undermines political parties and other organisations. To this end, the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to achieve this objective.

COMMENT

It is disappointing that the Parties remained glued to their past in that what they agreed has been agreed to before but has failed to work.

What they should have agreed with the benefit of hindsight is what to do about the causes of past failure to uphold agreements.
In the March 29 electioneering most of the agreements and resolutions herein held to a large extent. When the outcome became evident to Zanu PF, the rules were set aside and replaced with violent impunity.

That was possible because JOC hijacked the ZEC mandate and the results of post March retribution are there for all to see.

Instead of agreeing on licensing media houses that are externally exiled because of fear of military retribution, agreement should be on how to bar military interference with legal publishing houses in the country to avoid exposing the country to hostile publications from media houses outside the jurisdiction of the country.

As long as there is no action taken against security operatives that haunted the media houses into exile, none will be encouraged to set shop in the country and subject themselves to the vagaries of State agents.


ARTICLE XX

Framework for a new Government

Parties acknowledged that they had an obligation to establish a framework of working together in an inclusive government;

They accepted that the formation of such a government will have to be approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise;

They further recognised that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the respect of the Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of the millions of our people.

They expressed determination to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our country to stability and prosperity;

In doing so they acknowledged the need for gender parity, particularly the need to appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts and agreed that:

Executive Powers and Authority

 The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this Constitution and legislation.
 The President of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.
 The Prime Minister of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.
 The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law.
 In the exercise of executive authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit underlying the formation of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion both inside and outside government.

COMMENT

All very well stated on paper but there are no measures against which exercise of power by the various role players can be measured.

Further to that it is not clear which executive powers the identified positions shall have so we assume it’s all the powers giving rise to the first point of the agreement that is likely to cause future conflict because of its ambiguity.
Evidence of that conflict emerged at the signing ceremony with the PM calling for external help and support and the President vilifying external interference through support aimed at causing regime change.

The President did was oblivious that he had signed a regime change agreement as he remained deeply entrenched n the past glories of his Party.

His beliefs that regime change had not been agreed upon manifested when he a few days after signing pronounced he and his party were still in the driving seat despite losing elections.


In an attempt to address the ambiguity created by assigning Executive power to the Cabinet, Premiership and Presidency the parties agreed on the roles each would play as follows:-

The Cabinet

 shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the consequential programmes;
 shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for the implementation of such policies and programmes;
 shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such legislation and other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies and programmes of the National Executive;
 shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or action by the President, approve all international agreements;
 shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, have sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity to carry out their functions effectively;
 shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all Cabinet decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member of Cabinet.
 The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries between them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision.

COMMENT

It is not clear from this section where the policies and consequential programmes to be evaluated and adopted by Cabinet will come from. One has to read the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers’ roles to gain a clear insight into this.

Allocation of financial resources for implementation of policies and programmes by the Cabinet will be subject to Parliamentary approval which is most welcome.

Where the National Executive- (presumably this means the Presidency) directs Cabinet to implement policies and programmes Cabinet shall prepare and present legislative motions to Parliament necessary to regulate implementation which is as it should be.

Cabinet will approve all international agreements that are not constitutionally prescribed or that do not require Parliamentary ratification.

The responsibility for ensuring adequate funding for projects and programmes rest with the Cabinet Portfolio Ministries they fall under and will as indicated be subject to Parliamentary approval.

Cabinet decisions will be subjected to the principle of collective responsibility.

It is not clear how the allocation of Cabinet Ministries between the Prime Minister and President for supervision arose in this section but it appears there was agreement that the President and the Prime Minister will have agreed sets of Ministers reporting directly to each of them subject to the division of the portfolios they reach between them.


The President

In terms of the agreement the role of the President will be;
 chairs Cabinet;
 exercises executive authority;
 shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
 can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace;
 can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law;
 confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet;
 grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends or remits sentences, on the advice of Cabinet;
 chairs the National Security Council;
 formally appoints the Vice Presidents;
 shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties;
 formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance with this agreement;
 after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this Agreement;
 accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers;
 appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the Constitution;
 appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in consultation with the Prime Minister;
 in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the President is required to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament;
 may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament;
 must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of the government business and;
 shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of any particular matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet in this regard.

COMMENT

Prior to this agreement the President used to exercise these powers at his sole discretion but now is required to consult with the Minister, Vice Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers.

It would be irresponsible not to slam the bloated top echelons of power that have been expanded by the addition of accommodative positions of Vice Presidents and Deputy Prime Ministers.

As Head of State most of The President’s powers rightly devolve from the Constitution but his exercise of those powers has now to be checked by the VP’s, PM and DPM’s which positive development on paper, must translate into action.

For the first time in his lengthy stay as Head of State President Mugabe will have to consult someone before making key statutory appointments and may not dissolve parliament unless he has consulted the PM and acting in the spirit of the consensus between him and the PM.

President Mugabe as already failed his first sincerity test in the agreement as was largely expected to happen.

His first job was to formally appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties and formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance with this agreement.

He has done none such requirement and instead chosen to abdicate responsibility for attending to the fixing of the National crisis as agreed preferring rather to attend the UN talk show where he will get nothing other than international derision.

His ally President Mbeki facing serious domestic political unrest has resigned and South Africa did not send a deputy Head of State to the UN meeting as they realized the importance of solving their home crisis ahead of posturing at the UN meeting in America.


The Prime Minister
According to the agreement the PM’s role is defined as;
 chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet;
 exercises executive authority;
 shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet;
 shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of government;
 shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will report to the Prime Minister on all issues relating to the implementation of such policies and plans;
 shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry out its functions is in place: in this regard, he/she shall have the responsibility to discharge the functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament;
 shall be a member of the National Security Council;
 may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of the Inclusive Government;
 shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers;
 shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.

COMMENT

Either both SADC and AU were either naive to allow the signing of the agreement to pass without overseeing the swearing in of the PM, VP’s and DPM’s immediately after the signing in ceremony or they had misplaced trust in Mugabe adhering to the agreement.

Alternatively they wanted to pave the way for Mugabe’s recognition and legitimisation and leave other Parties to the agreement the onerous task of pushing for their dues which would be violently resisted by Zanu PF and Mugabe.

The MDC Parties were more culpable in this regard as they should have made that demand a precondition to the signing ceremony which they did not and are paying heavily for it.

Be that as it may when eventually President Mugabe will find it convenient to abide by the agreement or when Parliament reconvenes and take the bull by its horns and move a motion for the enactment of Constitutional Amendment No 19 paving the way for Tsvangirai, Mutambara and Khupe to become legitimate PM and DPM’s respectively, the PM will officially assume the responsibilities herein.

He will oversee policy formulation by the Cabinet and ensure policy implementation by the entire government and not the President as was the case.

All ministers will report to him on matters related to policy implementation and therein lays his overall power to make a difference on how the government will operate.

He will, as Leader of Government business in Parliament, ensure that before any policies projects and programmes are implemented that enabling legislation is in place or the programme, projects and policies will not take off.

He will become a member of the National Security Council that will replace JOC and influence decisions in that body which hitherto has been reserved for President Mugabe to direct and influence. If he fails it is not because he is denied access but because his ideas are not nationally palatable for the rest of the powerful body currently credited with propping President Mugabe’s overstay in power.

It is not clear who will assign him the additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of the Inclusive Government but clearly it is safe to deduce that since his role will be constitutionally provide for his assignments will devolve from Parliament.

In executing his functions he shall be assisted by Deputy Prime Ministers and shall report regularly to the President and Parliament.

The President will thus be the ultimate reporting point for all government programmes but he will not have his way in vetoing the Prime Minister and his team given the Parliamentary checks and balances in place and the role requirements in his own position.

Council of Ministers

To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to oversee the implementation of the work of government, the agreement set up a Council of Ministers consisting of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, whose functions shall be:-

 to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions;
 to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government;
 to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees;
 to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions;
 to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the periodic review mechanism; and
 to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review mechanism.

COMMENT

This is the body that clearly wields overall Executive power as it assesses the operations of Cabinet and provides periodic performance feedback through evaluation of Cabinet operations.

Composition of the Executive

It was agreed between the Parties that the National Executive shall be set up as below.

1. There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
2. There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the President and/or Zanu-PF.
3. There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai.
4. There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one (1) from the MDC-M.
5. There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU PF, thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to vote.
6. There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by ZANU PF, six (6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M.
7. Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the Inclusive Government.

COMMENT

This is a massive executive for a country gripped by the worst economic turmoil in the world at present.

The allocation of Cabinet portfolios was based on the ratio of political formation support garnered on 29 March 2008 elections except for the positions of President, Prime Minister, Vice President, and Deputy Prime Ministers where the results of military coercion were upheld.

This is a dangerous precedent for SADC and AU democracy dispute resolution that must be condemned in the strongest terms possible.

Democracy conflict must be resolved politically with resolutions upholding the wishes of the electorate and nothing should replace that.

Senate

The Parties agreed that;

 The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing positions of Presidential senatorial appointments as was provided in Constitutional Amendment No 18.
 There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M.

COMMENT

There was absolutely no basis upon which it was agreed that Parties create a further 9 Senate seats other than to accommodate electoral losers which is total disrespect of the electorate.

Even then it is not clear why one Party has benefited eight unelected positions in the Senate while others got only three.

Why these unelected positions were not aggregated and apportioned using the March 29 overall electoral results as was the case with Cabinet posts is indicative of the opportunism by the movers of this section of the agreement?

Filling of vacancies

In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 20.1.7 of the agreement, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising.

COMMENT

Since all these positions are a result of political negotiation how else was it envisaged they would be filled if not by appointment by the Party that cut the deal?

Electoral Vacancies

Parties were aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by elections;
Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and people of Zimbabwe; and

They recognised the need to give people of Zimbabwe some breathing space and a healing period;

The Parties thereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying with the rules governing its internal democracy.

COMMENT

While the motive behind this article is understandable and noble it leaves room for bye elections to be held in respect of positions that fell vacant prior to 11 September 2008 and that must be addressed in further negotiations.

Such glaring inconsistencies could have been avoided had the negotiations been held in a transparent forum where the affected people were allowed to input their views prior to the agreement.

But then this is Zimbabwe where it is acceptable for amendments become necessary before the principal agreement is put in operation.

Implementation mechanisms

To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement, the Parties constituted a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee ("JOMIC") to be composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Gender consideration must be taken into account in relation to the composition of JOMIC.

The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties.

The committee shall have the following functions:-

 to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement;
 to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety;
 to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement;
 to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the parties; and
 to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties.

JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary for the fulfillment of this Agreement.

The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security forces conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe including laws relating to public order and security.

The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the Facilitator, SADC and the AU.

The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance of SADC and the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new Government's economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting of sanctions taken against Zimbabwe and some of its leaders.

The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation to the extent necessary to bring this agreement into full force.

COMMENT

Since the Parties have already agreed that they will support legislation in Parliament to allow the agreement to have legal force under Zimbabwean laws, why does the Speaker not bring forward the reconvening date of Parliament to attend to this urgent business given that none of the current Executives are legitimate nor have the interest to hasten their departure from office.

Some of these negotiated clauses need to be pushed through by those that believe in their value for the nation.

Hesitancy to do so can be misconstrued to mean the new order is far from ready to govern.

It was naive for the Parties to leave implementation in the hands of the facilitator without provision as to what happens in the event he became incapacitated to carry out the responsibility for whatever reason. As it stands the agreement is in trouble over the resignation of the facilitator.
Periodic review mechanism

Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as set out in this Agreement, the Parties agreed that:
 they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to review on an annual basis progress on the implementation and achievement of the priorities and objectives set out in this Agreement, namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, national healing and cohesion and unity, external interference, free political activity, rule of law, state organs and institutions, legislative agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and prevention of violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and
 the committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new government on any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly on measures and programmes that may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this Agreement.
 this Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed at the conclusion of the constitution-making process.
 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter relating to the functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the Constitution in consultation with the Guarantors.

COMMENT

When and how will this review committee be established if it was not agreed during negotiations. As it is there is more to review and correct than is going right with this agreement.

Interim Constitutional amendments

The Parties agreed:-

 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the implementation of this agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to by the President as Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The Parties undertake to unconditionally support the enactment of the said Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 19;
 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties executed at Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft).

COMMENT

Why were the relevant chapters and sections of the secretive Kariba Draft Constitution not reproduced in this agreement for analysis by all interested citizens as to their relevance and suitability for inclusion in Constitutional Amendment No 19?

This arrogant way of governing borrowed from Mr Mbeki will in future become entrenched and boomerang to haunt its disciples out of office as has happened to the chief proponent of the quiet diplomacy.

Commencement

This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties.

COMMENT

Really? If that is the case why are the positions it created still dysfunctional? The agreement is not operational and if the final clause is any standard to measure it on it is as good as nonexistent.

The Parties must assert themselves in terms of the final clause and put the agreement on the spot and see how the underwriters will respond to the vicious response it will elicit from the forces that refused to accept the electoral outcome of 29 March 2008.

Kufamba NaJesu